Abstract. In "Modern Moral Philosophy" Anscombe argues that the distinction between intention of an end or means and foresight of a consequentially comparable outcome proves crucial in actevaluation. The deontologist J. J. Thomson disagrees. She asserts that Anscombe mistakes the distinction's moral import; it bears on agent-evaluation, not act-evaluation. I map out the contours of this dispute. I show that it implicates other disagreements, some to be expected and others not to be expected. Amongst the expected, one finds the ethicists' accounts of action and understanding of how agent-assessment relates to act-assessment. Amongst the unexpected, one finds the moralists' views about the possibility of self-imposed moral dilemmas and allied positions concerning temporal aspects of "ought implies can." Anscombe's employment of the distinction in act-evaluation withstands close scrutiny; Thomson's denial of it does not.
Years later, in a little-noted book chapter in which she considers the I/F distinction, Foot endorses it, saying: "In 'The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect' I argued, (wrongly, as I now think) that the distinction between direct and indirect intention was irrelevant to moral judgement." Philippa Foot, "Morality, Action and Outcome," Morality and Objectivity:
A Tribute to J. L. Mackie, ed. Ted Honderich (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) , 23-38, at 37n6. 7 In subsequent treatments of DE, Anscombe displays ambivalence towards it-especially to the abuses to which it has been put. For a more extensive consideration of her thought, see T.
A. Cavanaugh, "Abuses of Double Effect, Anscombe' What I refer to is a failure to take seriously enough the fact-I think it is plainly a factthat the question whether it is morally permissible for a person to do a thing is just not the same as the question whether the person who does it is thereby shown to be a bad person. 8 Thomson claims that Anscombe errs in giving the I/F distinction a role in act-assessment in double effect cases. For, according to her lights, it lacks relevance in that arena. Rather, it has import in agent-assessment. (Of course, Anscombe and friends of DE more generally agree on its relevance in agent-assessment.) Let us examine this dispute and the allied matters it implicates.
II. By contrast (and as Anscombe herself holds), administering a lethal drug to a consenting, terminally ill patient in order to kill her and, thereby, end her pain (VAE) is not ethically in the clear. 12 For, while consequentially similar to PS, such an act instances the deliberate killing of a for the sake of precision, not in order to put weight upon it. In physician-assisted suicide (PAS), a practice allied to VAE, the physician writes a prescription for a lethal drug which the patient fills and takes at her discretion.
Two Cases: Ambiguous Intent (AI) and Revengeful Intent (RI
10 See, e.g., Anscombe, "War and Murder," in Ethics, Religion and Politics, The Collected Philosophical Papers, vol. 3 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) , 51-61, at 54. 13 Thomson writes that she knows of no case other than the contrast between PS and VAE in which the law regards two consequentially comparable acts as illegal/legal based on the I/F distinction (Thomson, "Physician-Assisted Suicide," 515.) Indeed, the distinction proves crucial legally. To provide but one signal example found in U.S. Constitutional law that illustrates the point, consider how to read the first words of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
Were a legislator to make a law with the intention of establishing or of restricting the free exercise of a religion, etc., such a law would, thereby, by that very intent, be illegal. Absent such an intent, a law that has the effect of establishing or prohibiting can be legal, other criteria being met (into which I will not here go). For a consideration of U.S. Constitutional casuistry If a doctor will inject her patient intending his death as an end and, moreover, wants his death only because his death will constitute revenge, then that does matter morally.
But we have to be careful about how it matters. I suggest that it has no bearing on whether it is morally permissible for her to act. Whatever her intention may be, the patient, we are supposing, desperately wants her to inject the drug.… We are to imagine a physician who has two morally salient intents, one to relieve her patient's pain and one to kill her patient. Were she to inject the patient with the drug, she knows she would do so with the intent to relieve the patient's pain. However, she cannot conclude that were she to inject, she would do so only to relieve the patient's pain. She might also inject in order to kill her patient. Given this opacity concerning how operative her intention of the bad would be, 17 Ibid.
Importantly, she reasonably judges herself as having the intent to palliate her patient's pain.
Thus, in this respect, she reasonably judges herself as seeking to act well by her patient. Were she to act, her act would in fact be one of palliating her patient's pain. By contrast, the physician in RI is entirely morally lost. For she lacks the normative intent to relieve her patient's pain while hating her patient. Indeed, were she to act, her act would not even be one of killing in order to end pain; rather, it would be one of revengeful homicide.
Concerning AI, consider the doctor's ethically problematic homicidal intent. She cannot reasonably rule this intent out as operative in her action. Importantly, neither can she reasonably rule it in. It might be operative; but, then again, it might not. This is not the same as reasonably judging herself as intending the bad at issue (as is the case in RI). Were she reasonably to judge herself as intending her patient's death (as the physician in RI must), a moralist employing DE would have to advise her not to act. However, given (1) her confident judgment that her intent to relieve her patient's pain would be operative, (2) her doubt concerning how operative her homicidal intent would be, and (3) Thomson does not consider this signal possibility.
Rather, she assumes that an agent can always do the right deed. Therefore, she must treat intent as irrelevant in the determination of the deed as right. For, otherwise, the agent in RI would not be able to do the right deed. She would face a moral dilemma. Thomson, however, dismisses the possibility of an agent facing two incompatible oughts (or, in other words, a moral dilemma):
I think myself that it was not merely odd but patently incorrect to think that (3) I ought to give C a banana and (4) I ought to give D a banana can both be true compatibly with my having only one banana; I think we simply do not use the English word "ought" in such a way that this is so. In any case, I will not. I will throughout so use "ought" that it cannot be the case that I ought to do alpha and ought to do beta where I cannot do both alpha and beta. Ross uses "motive" to refer to intent of one's end. In the case at hand, it would be the intent of revenge as an end, per Thomson's usage. Ross draws attention to the temporal aspects of an agent's intentions-referring to "some future occasion"-only to neglect the very import he suggests: namely, that had one in the past cultivated an intent, one would here and now be able to act on it (as one ought One reasonably thinks, however, that while our agent cannot here and now rid herself of the objectionable intent, there was a time when she was able to avoid acquiring it. "Ought implies can" applies immediately to that past time and mediately here and now. (The same holds for her loss of the intent to palliate.) Thus, the claim (arising from DE) that the physician in RI faces a moral dilemma does not violate the noted moral truism. It does, however, suggest that we expand our ethical investigations beyond the beguiling putatively all-encompassing "now."
Doing so enables a moralist to acknowledge that an agent can so act in the past as to become incapable of right action now. Considering that past moment, Thomson might reject the attribution of the wrongness to the act, claiming it is applicable only to the agent. Regardless, the preceding establishes that that move would amount to mere assertion. More importantly, it would make this move against the I/F distinction's use in act-analysis without any consideration of the history of an agent's intentions and the (presumptive) control she exercises over intentionformation.
neglect the historical character of human agency and the attending temporal aspects of "ought implies can."
Our inquiry into the genesis of the physician's intentions indicates a complexity Thomson does not acknowledge. According to the overarching moral theory of which DE serves as a part, the physician in RI faces a moral dilemma of her own making. She can either kill her patient revengefully (an act ruled out of bounds by malice) or forego the obligatory act of palliating her patient's otherwise intractable pain (a violation of a serious obligation). The physician wrongs whether she injects or not. In light of the egregious waywardness of a physician who can palliate only by intending to kill her patient revengefully, why would this result boggle one employing a sound ethic? A moralist with a realistic imagination and a sensitivity for the intricacy of the moral life will not find the possibility of a self-inflicted moral dilemma obviously incorrect.
Indeed, to take but one example, Aquinas-with whom DER originates-considers self-imposed moral impasses plausible. Concerning the logic of such an act, Aquinas notes:
just as in syllogisms, given one error it is necessary that others follow; so also in morals, one error posited, from necessity others follow.
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her work in ethics, however, nowhere suggests the denial of moral dilemmas. Her affinity for Aquinas's ethics suggests she would find them possible. More importantly, in a theological text she explicitly asserts that "sometimes the same thing both ought to be and ought not to be" and that the "identity of something that both ought to be and ought not to be is not impossible." G. E. How is the agent in RI bad? Her badness concerns her in a certain respect. Paraphrasing
Anscombe's discussion of acts, one might say that an agent is bad (or good) "under some description." 27 She may exercise agency in many capacities: as an employer, a mother, or a pianist. Her badness does not concern these roles. Although nothing hinges on it, having acknowledged that she is bad as an agent, Thomson would presumably also hold her to be bad as can get himself out; namely, by "dismissing the bad intention," "potest intentionem malam
dimittere." Hence, we ought not think that a moral dilemma (as Aquinas conceives of it) is entirely inescapable; it is, however, on the supposition of the bad intent. 26 Thomson, "Physician-Assisted Suicide," 517. Consider, a potter makes pots; a ballerina dances. In the case of potting we have a product distinct from the activity; in the case of dancing we have the activity. The bad potter makes bad pots and the bad ballerina dances poorly-or, if I may so speak, makes bad dances.
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In both instances, the defect in the agent as an agent indicates a defect in the product made or in the act performed. Because defects in the making of actually distinct products (e.g., pots) are not applicable to the acts we consider, put the making of a product case to the side. Let us consider 28 When it comes to products, the reverse need not hold. As Chaucer shows in Canterbury Tales, the worst poem can be the work of the master poet-consider Sir Thopas. Of course, as
Aristotle famously notes, excellent agency at times excludes acting badly-such that the generous person cannot act stingily, nor the virtuous person viciously, in respect of that in terms of which he is virtuous (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 5, 1140b24). We, however, move in the opposite direction, looking into the viability of assessing an agent negatively while not assessing the agent's act negatively (at least as far as permissibility). At this apparent impasse, one notes that Thomson holds that while the agent in RI is bad, her act is permissible. For an act to be permissible is for it to be ethically in bounds. It may lack perfection, by having some bad-making features, while still being within the boundaries that ethics requires of it. Perhaps Thomson would be willing to concede the analytical point that a negative assessment of an agent makes for a negative assessment of the corresponding act while holding that the negative assessment of the act need not amount to impermissibility. It might, rather, indicate a defect in the act that falls short of ruling it out of bounds. If we wish further to advance the conversation, I suggest we take this tack. It directs our attention to the issue of permissibility. Let us consider this criterion.
Roughly, Thomson holds that permissibility of an act is to be understood in terms of claims that individuals have against agents not to be caused harm. In the case of RI, the patient has a claim not to be revengefully killed by the physician while also having a claim to pain relief.
Of course, the two claims conflict in the case at hand. For, given this physician's intention, pain relief cannot occur except as coincident upon revengeful killing. The fulfillment of one claim involves the infringement of another. How does Thomson determine permissibility when it comes to the infringement of a claim? She proposes, "It is permissible to infringe a claim if and only if infringing it would be sufficiently much better for those for whom infringing it would be good than not infringing it would be for the claim holder."
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In RI, the individual patient is at once the one whose claim is infringed and the one benefitted by the infringement. Regarding such a case, she suggests we determine permissibility in terms of "how bad things are for the claim holder if the claim is infringed." 30 Well, how bad are things for the patient? Which is worse, to be revengefully albeit painlessly killed by one's physician or to die in unrelieved pain? Perhaps most of us would opt for being painlessly but revengefully killed. Regardless, who would in turn say that the doctor's act of revengeful killing is, thereby, sans phrase, ethically permissible?
Consider this point from another vantage: if "bad" correctly assesses the physician in RI (as it does), then would not "ethically out of bounds," "wrong," even "impermissible" correctly assess the corresponding act? To consider one a "bad person," as Thomson (rightly) regards the physician in RI, amounts to a significantly negative character evaluation. The doctor in RI has serious defects. She both lacks the normative intent to relieve her patient's pain and bears revengeful homicidal intent towards her patient. These are not minor flaws in a physician.
Hence, she merits the evaluation Thomson assigns to her: bad. As argued, a defect in the agent implicates a defect in the act. By parity of reasoning, a grave defect in the agent implicates a grave defect in the act. "Bad" as said of an agent would seem to implicate "impermissible" as said of an act.
29 Thomson, The Realm of Rights, 174. 30 Ibid., 175. By contrast, Anscombe and others who employ the I/F distinction would maintain that, in RI, just as "bad" correctly assesses the agent, so also "malicious," "wrong," "ethically out of bounds," and "impermissible" correctly evaluate the agent's act. In any case, we here come to an impasse between the disputants. How shall we proceed? Let us (albeit briefly, due to the extensive treatments each offer as well as a need for brevity) consider their accounts of action, a topic upon which one would expect them to differ, as they do-dramatically.
IV.
Cause or Agent? The dispute concerning the I/F distinction (unexpectedly) implicates a difference concerning moral dilemmas and temporal aspects of "ought implies can." Less surprisingly, it involves differences over what constitutes an act. In Intention, Anscombe articulates an account of human action as characteristically intentional. In doing so, she stands in a long tradition (that includes, amongst many others, Aristotle, Aquinas, Bentham, and Mill). In Intention Anscombe speaks of our "special interest in human actions," or ethics.
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Because intention defines uniquely human acts, when we do ethics, we have a particular interest in an agent's intentions-if only to determine the subject matter of our investigation (actions).
One who thinks that intention in part distinguishes what ethics studies (acts) from phenomena associated with humans that ethics does not investigate (digestings, fallings, and so on) also reasonably thinks that differences in intention can make for differences in act-evaluation. For as intent makes an act an act, differences in intent make for differences in acts-presumably including evaluative differences. Given Anscombe's extended argument for intention as partially constitutive of action, one sees grounds for her acknowledgment of the I/F distinction's role in act-assessment.
While there is a theoretical elegance and immediate plausibility in an account (like Although her name appears nowhere in Thomson's work on acts, Anscombe is the contemporary thinker who most completely attends to the here curiously named "other notion of agency" (and thus founds the modern discipline of action-theory). Thomson neglects agency to focus on causality. As she tells us above, she does so because her principal interest is a theory of rights in which we have claims upon others, e.g., not to be caused harm (not to have certain effects happen to us which are affiliated with others as causes). By focusing on causality and not agency (or human action), Thomson advances a properly legal notion of strict liability. She errs, however, in applying this account broadly to morality.
To see this, consider an example-call it "Parcel"-that Anscombe offers: "Suppose I am 7 a parcel-I mean I've been made up into a parcel-and by sheer accident I get set rolling down a 8 Anscombe (surely correctly) holds that she does nothing morally wrong in Parcel because she does nothing at all. She does not act; therefore, there is no act to evaluate. Day's End: B always comes home at 9 P. M. and the first thing he does is to flip the light switch in his hallway. He did so this evening. B's flipping the switch caused a circuit to close. By virtue of an extraordinary series of coincidences, unpredictable in advance by anybody, the circuit's closing caused a release of electricity (a small lightning flash) in A's house next door. Unluckily, A was in its path and was therefore badly burned. 38 Thomson holds that B (morally) ought not to flip the switch. If B does, B infringes a claim of A's. Her assumption that B's mental states cannot make a difference to act-evaluation leads her to this odd position. She holds it would be "weird in us" to say, "Look B, we know something that you don't know. If we tell you, then it will be true to say that you ought not flip the switch, but not if we don't tell you." 39 She does not acknowledge that were B to act with such knowledge, B would thereby perform an act that (now) includes voluntarily burning A. For, as Thomson's disregard for ethics' focus upon knowing-willing agency (or human agency)
